5dive

5dive MCP server

Expose the 5dive agent-fleet CLI as Model Context Protocol tools. Point any MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, or your own) at this stdio server to file tasks, inspect and message agents, and read the fleet digest — directly from inside a model context.

5dive is the CLI + control plane for running a fleet of autonomous coding agents as a self-governing company. This server is a thin, honest adapter: every tool shells out to the local 5dive binary's machine-readable --json surface and returns the result — so it inherits the CLI's auth, permissions, and audit log for free, and never handles secrets itself.

Tools

Tool	Wraps	What it does
task_create	5dive task add	File a task in the shared queue (title, body, priority, assignee, parent).
task_show	5dive task show	Full detail for one task by id (status, body, result, subtasks, blockers).
task_list	5dive task ls	List tasks (open by default; filter by status / assignee).
agent_send	5dive agent send	Send a message to another agent on the fleet.
agent_list	5dive agent list	List every agent: type, channels, model, live state.
digest_get	5dive digest	Fleet daily standup digest (window: "7d" for the weekly view).

Requirements

• Node.js >= 18
• The 5dive CLI installed and on PATH (curl https://install.5dive.ai | sudo bash).

Install & run

npx @5dive/mcp        # run directly
# or
npm i -g @5dive/mcp && 5dive-mcp

Client config (Claude Desktop / Cursor / Cline)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "5dive": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@5dive/mcp"],
      "env": { "FIVEDIVE_SUDO": "1" }
    }
  }
}

Remote mode: 5dive-mcp serve (ChatGPT, OpenAI dots)

A client that runs in someone else's cloud can't spawn a stdio process on your box. serve puts the same six tools behind MCP's Streamable HTTP transport, on loopback, for your reverse proxy to publish over HTTPS.

Using managed 5dive? You don't need this: connect to https://api.5dive.com/mcp and sign in. See the guide.

# 1. Mint a token. It is printed once; only its hash is kept.
5dive-mcp token create --name=chatgpt            # read-only
5dive-mcp token create --name=chatgpt --write    # may also file tasks and message agents

# 2. Serve on loopback (default 127.0.0.1:8741, path /mcp).
FIVEDIVE_SUDO=1 5dive-mcp serve

# 3. Publish it over HTTPS, e.g. with Caddy (automatic certificates):
#    agents.example.com {
#        reverse_proxy /mcp* 127.0.0.1:8741
#    }

Then point the client at it:

• Clients that can send a header (Claude Code, the MCP inspector, most SDKs): https://agents.example.com/mcp with Authorization: Bearer <token>.
• ChatGPT developer mode offers only OAuth or "No authentication", so put the token in the URL and choose "No authentication": https://agents.example.com/mcp/<token>.

5dive-mcp token list shows the tokens; 5dive-mcp token revoke --name=chatgpt cuts one off, and a running server refuses it from the next request.

serve flag	Default	Purpose
--listen	127.0.0.1:8741	Address to bind. A non-loopback address is refused unless you pass --allow-public-http.
--path	/mcp	Mount point.
--rate	60	Tool calls per token per minute.

Security: what opening this endpoint means

• What a token can do. A read-only token can list agents and tasks, read a task, and read the digest. A --write token can also file tasks (task_create) and message agents (agent_send). No token can answer a gate, change settings, spend money, or run anything outside those six CLI calls, each built as a fixed argv with no shell. Whatever sender the remote client claims is dropped: its messages arrive labelled mcp-<token name>, and its tasks say in their body which connection filed them.
• Who it runs as. The tools run with the rights of the user running serve, plus root through sudo when FIVEDIVE_SUDO=1. The server only ever runs those six subcommands, but a compromised server process holds that user's rights, so run it as a dedicated user whose sudo grant covers only the 5dive binary.
• Rate limit. 60 calls a minute per token by default (--rate), counted per JSON-RPC message: batches are refused before anything runs. Bodies over 1 MiB are refused.
• Audit. Every tool call, allowed or refused, appends one line to audit.jsonl: time, token name, tool, outcome, client IP (from X-Forwarded-For when the proxy is on loopback), and the ids and names involved. Message text and task bodies are never written.
• Tokens at rest. tokens.json (mode 0600) holds a SHA-256 of each token, never the token. Both files live in $FIVEDIVE_MCP_HOME, default ~/.config/5dive-mcp.
• A token in the URL is a password in the URL. Your reverse proxy's access log records request paths. Turn path logging off for /mcp/*, or use header auth where the client supports it. Anyone holding the URL holds the token.
• Plain HTTP stays on loopback. serve refuses a public bind by default, because the token would cross the network unencrypted.

Prefer no inbound port at all? OpenAI's Secure MCP Tunnel runs a small client next to the server and connects out to OpenAI. Its tunnel-client can launch the stdio server directly (--mcp-command "npx -y @5dive/mcp"), but it needs an OpenAI Platform organization with tunnel permissions.

Configuration (env vars)

Var	Default	Purpose
FIVEDIVE_BIN	5dive	Path to the 5dive binary.
FIVEDIVE_SUDO	(unset)	Set to 1 to prefix calls with sudo. Managed 5dive boxes require root for most subcommands; leave unset if you already run as root.
FIVEDIVE_TIMEOUT_MS	30000	Per-call timeout in milliseconds.
FIVEDIVE_MCP_HOME	~/.config/5dive-mcp	Where serve keeps tokens.json and audit.jsonl.

Safety

Arguments are passed to the CLI as an argv array with no shell, so tool input can never be interpreted as shell syntax. The server never sees secrets: the CLI reads its own credentials from the box.

Scope

This mirrors a curated slice of the CLI (tasks, agents, digest), not its full surface. It is a distribution and convenience layer, not a new API. For everything else, use the 5dive CLI directly (5dive --help). Full docs: https://5dive.ai/docs/5dive-cli

License

MIT